Colorado River Indian Tribes v. Marsh

In Colorado River Indian Tribes v. Marsh, Plaintiffs, Indian tribes and an environmental organization, sought to enjoin the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers from issuing a permit to a developer for the placement of riprap along the western shore of the Colorado River in California. The purpose of the riprap was to stabilize the riverbank and establish a permanent boundary line for private property that the developer proposed to subdivide and develop into a residential and commercial community. The site of the development, known as the River City project, was directly across the river from the Colorado River Indian Reservation and directly south of additional portions of the reservation lying on the west side of the river. The land abutting the development site on the west was owned by the United States and administered by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) of the Department of the Interior. The BLM land, an archeological district, included several significant cultural and archeological sites.

The developer applied to the Corps for the riprap permit in April 1978. The following fall, the Corps prepared an environmental assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and concluded that, because significant impact upon the environment would result from the developer's proposed project, an environmental impact statement (EIS) should be prepared. The draft EIS was prepared and published in September 1979. In January 1981, the Corps informed the developer that a thorough cultural resources survey of resources on and near the proposed development site was needed before the Corps could complete the final EIS.

In June 1981, however, before the survey was begun, the Corps retracted the draft EIS as a result of changes in Corps policy regarding its jurisdictional authority and announced that no EIS and no further cultural resource evaluation were required. The Corps' decision to retract the draft EIS was apparently made in conformity with its proposed cultural resource regulations published in 1980, regulations that had never been adopted in final form or incorporated into the Code of Federal Regulations.

Under the proposed regulations, the Corps was required to assess both direct and indirect effects of its permits on properties listed or officially determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places. This review requirement extended beyond the area in which the permit would have direct physical effects to the "affected area," that area within which direct and indirect effects could be reasonably expected to occur.

For properties that were not listed or officially determined eligible for listing in the Register, but that might be eligible for the Register, the proposed regulations limited the Corps' review to the area within the Corps' jurisdiction‹the "permit area," defined as that area which would be physically affected by the proposed work. The Corps issued the riprap permit to the developer on May 21, 1982. Plaintiffs then filed this action, alleging that the Corps failed to comply with NEPA and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA).

After discussing the factors that must be present for a preliminary injunction to be granted, the court addressed the likelihood of plaintiffs' success on the merits of their case. Defendants first contended that no EIS was necessary under NEPA because Federal involvement in the River City project was minimal and "major Federal action" was therefore lacking. The court disagreed, finding that NEPA requires assessment of both direct and indirect effects of a proposed Federal action on both "on site" and "off site" locations. That there was minimal Federal involvement in the project did not excuse defendants from compliance with NEPA, for "it is not the degree of Federal involvement that influences the standard of living of our society, but is instead the potential and degree of impact from development that bears upon the overall welfare and enjoyment of our society." "Major Federal action" does not have a meaning under NEPA independent of "significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."

The Corps' limitation of the scope of its environmental assessment of the bank stabilization activities and its resulting conclusion that there would be no impact on cultural resources were improper and contrary to the mandate of NEPA.

The court next addressed plaintiff's claim that the Corps had violated NHPA by distinguishing between properties actually listed in or determined eligible for the National Register and properties that might be eligible for the Register and by affixing different historic review responsibilities to each. The court held that this distinction between properties and different scopes of responsibility was at odds with NHPA and the regulations of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation implementing Section 106 of NHPA. Using the Council's definition of "eligible property" in Section 800.2 of its regulations as encompassing all properties that meet the criteria for inclusion in the Register, the court concluded that, in enacting NHPA, Congress intended to protect all properties that are of inherent historic and cultural significance and not just those that have been "officially recognized" by the Secretary of the Interior. The court cited Executive Order No. 11593 and Section 110(a) of NHPA as support, finding that Federal agencies must exercise caution to ensure the physical integrity of those properties that appear to qualify for inclusion in the National Register.

The Corps' action in assessing the effects on properties that might qualify for inclusion in the National Register solely within the "permit area" and its failure to survey and consider the effects on like properties in the broader "affected area" was a breach of its responsibilities under NHPA.

Finally, the Court granted a preliminary injunction, finding that irreparable harm to cultural and archeological resources as a result of the development was possible. .